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Abstract. Postel-Vinay and Robin’s (2002) sequential auction model is extended to
allow for aggregate productivity shocks. Workers exhibit permanent diﬀerences in ability
while ﬁrms are identical. Negative aggregate productivity shocks induce job destruction
by driving the surplus of matches with low ability workers to negative values. Endoge-
nous job destruction coupled with worker heterogeneity thus provides a mechanism for
amplifying productivity shocks that oﬀers an original solution to the unemployment
volatility puzzle (Shimer, 2005). Moreover, positive or negative shocks may lead em-
ployers and employees to renegotiate low wages up and high wages down when agents’
individual surpluses become negative. The model delivers rich business cycle dynamics
of wage distributions and explains why both low wages and high wages are more pro-
cyclical than wages in the middle of the distribution and why wage inequality may be
countercyclical, as the data seem to suggest is true.
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1. Introduction
The initial motivation for this paper is two-fold. First, empirical results in Bonhomme
and Robin (2009) and Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), among others, suggest that
wage and earnings inequality increase in downturns (while earnings mobility decreases)
and that low earnings, and low wages to a lesser extent, are more procyclical than high
earnings or wages. The reason why it is so is not totally clear by lack of a theory of the
business cycle ﬂuctuations of wage distributions. Second, models of individual earnings
dynamics in Lillard and Willis (1978), Abowd and Card (1989), Moﬃtt and Gottschalk
(1995), Baker (1997), and numerous followers, consider extensions of the basic permanent-
transitory factor model:
yit = pti + tvit;
where yit is the residual of a regression of log earnings on time dummies, education, etc.,
and vit is a stationary (“transitory” ) process; pt and t are factor loadings, i.e. time-
varying parameters to be estimated. Increasingly more complex structures have been
proposed in the literature without strong economic rationale.
The aim of this work is to propose a theory of labour markets with heterogeneous
workers subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. A particular eﬀort
will be made to propose rational match-formation and wage-setting mechanisms that can
explain the strong counter-cyclicality of unemployment together with the special cyclical
patterns of the tails of cross-sectional wage distributions.
I use Postel-Vinay and Robin’s (2002) sequential auctions to model wage formation, in a
way that is similar to the model in Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2009) except than I allow for
aggregate shocks to productivity instead of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. Wage contracts are long
term contracts that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement only. Employees search on
the job and employers counter outside oﬀers. There is no invisible hand to set wages as
in a Walrasian equilibrium. Instead, it is assumed that ﬁrms have full monopsony power
vis-à-vis unemployed workers and hire them at a wage that is only marginally greater
than their reservation wage. A worker paid less than the competitive wage then has a
strong incentive to look for an alternative employer, and trigger Bertrand competition. InON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 3
such an environment, at a steady-state equilibrium, with identical workers and identical
ﬁrms, there are only two wages in the support of the equilibrium distribution: the lower
and the upper bounds of the bargaining set – either the ﬁrm gets all the surplus, or the
worker.
In a very inﬂuential paper, Shimer (2005) argues that the search-matching model of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) cannot reproduce unemployment dynamics well. A long
series of papers have tried to solve the puzzle, essentially by making wages sticky (Hall,
2005, Hall and Milgrom, 2008, Gertler and Trigari, 2009, Pissarides, 2009) or by reducing
the match surplus to a very small value Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Mortensen and
Nagypál (2007) review this literature and consider alternative mechanisms. Interestingly,
although endogenous job destruction is at the heart of the Mortensen-Pissarides model,
this literature has neglected endogenous job destruction as a possible amplifying mech-
anism when coupled with worker or match heterogeneity. Yet, we shall see that a small
fraction of workers (around 5%) at risk of a negative surplus suﬃces to amplify the eﬀect
of negative productivity shocks on unemployment above and beyond the steady exoge-
nous layoﬀ ﬂows. Realistic unemployment dynamics can be generated with an exogenous
layoﬀ rate of 4.3% and an overall job destruction rate of 4.5%. The 0.2% diﬀerence is
the endogenous part. Exogenous job destruction (idiosyncratic) implies a minimum un-
employment rate of about 4% (frictional unemployment). Endogenous job destruction
(driven by macroeconomic causes) induces additional unemployment ﬂuctuations between
0 and 5% (classical unemployment).
A few search-matching models with endogenous earnings distribution dynamics have
been recently proposed in the literature. Pissarides (2009) suggests a novel approach to
solve the unemployment volatility puzzle by assuming that productivity shocks change
entry wages in new jobs diﬀerently from wages in on-going jobs. Gertler and Trigari
(2009) generate wage stickiness using a Calvo-type mechanism such that only a fraction
of contracts are renegotiated in every period. Both models generate cross-sectional wage
dispersion but they do not address the issue of wage inequality dynamics. Here, wages
in new matches and wages in on-going matches may also be diﬀerent. However, wages
result from a state-dependent rent sharing mechanism that is totally independent ofON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 4
unemployment dynamics – unemployment dynamics depending on the level of the rent
(and how it compares to zero), not on how it is split.
Two other recent papers generate wage distribution dynamics. Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay (2008, 2009) study the non-equilibrium dynamics of the Burdett-Mortensen wage
posting model. Workers are identical but ﬁrms are diﬀerent. This model yields very
interesting insights on the business-cycle dynamics of ﬁrm size distributions. Menzio and
Shi (2009) also consider a wage posting model but they assume undirected search instead
of directed search. Neither ﬁrms nor workers are intrinsically diﬀerent but a new match
productivity value is drawn after setting up a new partnership.
In this paper, wage dispersion accrues partly because “starting wages” (upon exiting
unemployment) diﬀer from “promotion wages” (resulting from Bertrand competition);
partly because of workers’ heterogeneous abilities; and partly because the long term
nature of wage contracts obviates aggregate state dependence in a very special way. A
wage contract is renegotiated after a productivity shock if this shock puts the current
contract outside the bargaining set: a low wage suddenly becomes lower than the worker’s
reservation wage and the employer is forced to renegotiate the wage upward; a high wage
suddenly becomes higher than the employer’s reservation value and the worker is forced
to accept a wage cut. This makes both low and high wages more procyclical than wages
in the middle of the distribution.
Table 1 shows elasticities of three hourly wage inequality measures (D9/D5, D5/D1,
D9/D1 where Dx stands for the xth decile). Elasticities are calculated with respect
to aggregate unemployment (CPS) and productivity (BLS) using a log-log regression of
detrended series.1 The data seem to comply with the model’s predictions as the elasticity
of D9/D5 for wages, with respect to aggregate productivity, is positive and the elasticity
of D5/D1 is negative. Table 1 also displays the elasticities of inequality indices of annual
earnings. Low earnings are much more procyclical than wages. This indicates that
business cycle aﬀects hours worked more than wages (Heathcote, Perri, and Violante,
2010). We shall see that the dynamic sequential auction model can be calibrated in a
1The inequality data are obtained from about 20 years of CPS surveys starting in 1967. I am immensely
grateful to Gianluca Violante who passed me these data.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 5
D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1
Hourly Wage
Unempl. Rate (linear trend) -0.048 (0.014) 0.056 (0.018) 0.007 (0.017)
Unempl. Rate (HP-ﬁltered) -0.095 (0.003) 0.113 (0.011) 0.017 (0.009)
Productivity (linear trend) 0.21 (0.14) -0.53 (0.16) -0.32 (0.15)
Productivity (HP-ﬁltered) 0.44 (0.15) -0.98 (0.15) -0.53 (0.03)
Annual Earnings
Unempl. Rate (linear trend) 0.010 (0.012) 0.25 (0.032) 0.26 (0.033)
Unempl. Rate (HP-ﬁltered) -0.005 (.009) 0.36 (.024) 0.35 (0.025)
Productivity (linear trend) -0.10 (0.11) -1.41 (0.41) -1.51 (0.43)
Productivity (HP-ﬁltered) -0.044 (0.16) -2.46 (0.50) -2.51 (0.50)
Table 1. Wage and Earnings Inequality (Source: CPS, 1967-2005. Each
case displays the elasticity of the column variable with respect to the row
variable. The logged variables are ﬁrst detrended using a linear trend or
HP-ﬁltering.)
way that generates more procyclicality in low wages than in high wages and that also
produces a swifter employment response of low ability workers to aggregate productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. A dynamic sequential-auction model with heteroge-
neous workers and identical ﬁrms is ﬁrst developed. The DSGE model is so simple that
it can be exactly simulated. Then, the model’s parameters are estimated by simulated
GMM, and the results are interpreted.
2. The model
2.1. Setup.
Aggregate shocks. Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N. The global state of the
economy is an ergodic Markov chain yt 2 fy1 < ::: < yNg with transition matrix  = (ij)
(with a slight abuse of notation, yt denotes the stochastic process and yi an element of
the support). Aggregate shocks accrue at the beginning of each period.
Workers. There are M types of workers and `m workers of each type (with
PM
m=1 `m =
1). Each type is characterized by a time-invariant ability xm, m = 1;:::;M, with xm <
xm+1. Workers are paired with identical ﬁrms to form productive units. The per-period
output of a worker of ability xm when aggregate productivity is yi is denoted as yi(m).
A natural speciﬁcation for match productivity is yi(m) = xmyi. This seems the mostON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 6
neutral speciﬁcation as far as the cyclicality of relative match productivity dispersion is
concerned, i. e. yi(m)=yi(m0) only depends on worker types m and m0, not on the the
economy’s state i. We denote as St(m) the surplus of a match including a worker of type
xm, that is, the present value of the match minus the value of unemployment and minus
the value of a vacancy (assumed to be nil). Only matches with positive surplus St(m) > 0
are viable.
Turnover. Matches form and break at the beginning of each period, after the aggregate
state has been reset. Let ut(m) denote the proportion of unemployed in the population
of workers of ability xm at the end of period t   1, and let ut =
PM
m=1 ut(m)`m deﬁne
the aggregate unemployment rate. A the beginning of period t, a fraction 1fSt(m) 
0g[1 ut(m)]`m is endogenously laid oﬀ and another fraction 1fSt(m) > 0g[1 ut(m)]`m
is exogenously destroyed.
I assume that ﬁrms cannot direct their search to speciﬁc worker types. Also, for sim-
plicity, I assume that workers meet employers at exogenous rates; it is easy to work out
an extension of the model with a standard matching function if necessary. Thus, a frac-
tion 01fSt(m) > 0gut(m)`m of employable unemployed workers meet an employer and
a fraction 1(1   )1fSt(m) > 0g[1   ut(m)]`m of employed workers meet an alterna-
tive employer, where 0 and 1 are the respective search intensities of unemployed and
employed workers (exogenous).2
Wages. I assume that employers have full monopsony power with respect to workers.
Hence, unemployed workers are oﬀered their reservation wage, the employer taking all
the surplus. Rent sharing accrues via on-the-job search, which triggers competition of
employers for workers. Because ﬁrms are identical and there is no mobility cost, Bertrand
competition transfers the whole surplus to the worker who gets paid the ﬁrm’s reservation
value. This wage dynamics is equivalent to the optimal wage-tenure contracts studied
by Stevens (2004). She shows that an inﬁnity of wage-tenure contracts are optimal. In
particular employers could pay the workers their productivity and charge them an entry
fee.
2Unproductive unemployed workers search because they may turn productive in the next period.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 7
All ﬁrms being identical, a worker is indiﬀerent between staying with the incumbent
employer or moving to the poacher. I assume that the tie is broken in favour of the
poacher with probability .3
Turnover rates. The following turnover rates can then be computed:
 Exit rate from unemployment:
f0t = 0
P
m 1fSt(m) > 0gut(m)`m
ut
;
 Quit rate (job-to-job mobility):
f1t = 1(1   )
P
m 1fSt(m) > 0g[1   ut(m)]`m
1   ut
;
 Job destruction rate:
st =  + (1   )
P
m 1fSt(m)  0g(1   ut(m))`m
1   ut
:
Notice that the quit rate and the job separation rate are thus related by the following
deterministic relationship: f1t = 1(1   st):
2.2. Unemployment dynamics.
The value of unemployment. Let Ui(m) denote the present value of remaining unem-
ployed for the rest of period t for a worker of type m if the economy is in state i. We do
not index this value by any other state variable but the state of the economy for reasons
that will immediately become clear.
An unemployed worker receives a ﬂow-payment zi(m) for the period. At the beginning
of the next period, the state of the economy changes to yj with probability ij and the
worker receives a job oﬀer with some probability. However, because the employer has
full monopsony power and takes the whole surplus, the present value of a new job to
the worker is only marginally better than the value of unemployment. Consequently, the
3The randomness in the eventual mobility may explain why employers engage in Bertrand competition
in the ﬁrst place if part of the outcome of the production process is non transferable.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 8
value of unemployment solves the following linear Bellman equation:






The match surplus. After a productivity shock from i to j all matches yielding negative
surplus are destroyed. Otherwise, if the worker is poached, Bertrand competition transfers
the whole surplus to the worker whether she or he moves or not. Everything that the
worker or the ﬁrm will earn in the future is included in the deﬁnition of the current
surplus. The surplus of a match with a worker of type m when the economy is in state i
thus solves the following (almost linear) Bellman equation:






This almost-linear system of equations can be solved numerically by value function iter-
ation.
As for the unemployment value, the match surplus only depends on the state of the
economy, and in particular not on calendar time. Hence the match surplus process, for
workers of type m, St(m), is also a Markov chain with support fS(m);i = 1;:::;Ng and
transition matrix .
The unemployment process. The joint process of ut(m) and St(m), or ut(m) and
1fSt(m) > 0g, is Markovian, the law of motion of individual-speciﬁc unemployment
rates being:





1 if St(m)  0;
ut(m) + (1   ut(m))   0ut(m) if St(m) > 0:
Unemployment dynamics is independent on how the surplus is split between employers
and employees.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 9




1fSi(m) > 0g + 1fSi(m)  0g:













m=1 `m1fSi(m) > 0g is the number of employable workers.
The state-contingent equilibrium unemployment values are bounded from below by

+0. The aggregate unemployment rate is greater than this lower bound when a low
aggregate productivity value yi induces endogenous job destruction/non participation
(Li < 1 in steady state).
2.3. Wages.
The worker surplus. Let Wi(w;m) denote the present value of a wage w in state i to a
worker of type m. The surplus ﬂow for the current period is w   zi(m). In the following
period, the worker is laid oﬀ with probability 1fSj(m)  0g+1fSj(m) > 0g, and suﬀers
zero surplus. Otherwise, with probability 1, the worker receives an outside oﬀer and
enjoys the whole surplus. In absence of poaching (with probability 1 1) wage contracts
may still be renegotiated if a productivity shock moves the current wage outside the
bargaining set. We follow MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), and the recent application
by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) in a similar environment as the one of this paper, and
assume that the new wage contract is the closest point in the bargaining set from the
old, now infeasible wage. That is, if Wj(w;m)   Uj(m) < 0, the worker has a credible
threat to quit to unemployment and her employer accepts to renegotiate the wage up
to the point where the worker obtains zero surplus. If Wj(w;m)   Uj(m) > Sj(m), the
employer has a credible threat to ﬁre the worker unless she accepts to renegotiate down
to the point where she gets the whole surplus and no more.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 10
The worker surplus, Wi(w;m) Ui(m), therefore satisﬁes the following Bellman equa-
tion:








1Sj(m) + (1   1)(W






j (w;m)   Uj(m) = minfmaxfWj(w;m)   Uj(m);0g;Sj(m)g
is the renegotiated worker surplus.
Note that here again there is only one aggregate state variable, aggregate productivity.
The assumption that the rate of oﬀer arrival is exogenous is important to justify this
point. With a matching function the unemployment rate should be included in the
state space. However, a very good approximation would be obtained by assuming that
the unemployment rate and market tightness jump to their steady-state value after a
productivity shock.
The set of equilibrium wages. For all aggregate states yi and all worker types xm,
there are only two possible wages. Either the worker was oﬀered a job while unemployed,
and he can only claim a wage wi(m) such that Wi(wi(m);m) = Ui(m) (his reservation
wage); or he was already employed and he beneﬁts from a wage rise to wi(m) such that
Wi(wi(m);m) = Ui(m) + Si(m) (the employer’s reservation value).
I now explain how these wages can be solved for. For all k, let us denote the worker
surpluses when the economy is in state k evaluated at wages wi(m) and wi(m) as
W k;i(m) = Wk(wi(m);m)   Uk(m);




k;i(m) = minfmaxfW k;i(m);0g;Si(m)g;
W

k;i(m) = minfmaxfW k;i(m);0g;Si(m)g:ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 11
Making use of the deﬁnitions of wages, W i;i(m) = 0 and W i;i(m) = Si(m). These worker
surpluses therefore satisfy the following modiﬁed Bellman equations:






(kj   ij)1fSj(m) > 0g












(kj   ij)1fSj(m) > 0g






Again, value function iteration delivers a simple numerical solution algorithm, using for
starting value the solution of the linear system that is obtained by removing the “stars”
from the continuation values.
Having determined W k;i(m) and W k;i(m) for all k;i and m, wages then follow as
























2.4. The dynamics of wage distributions. The support of the wage distribution is
the union of all sets 
m = fwi(m);wi(m);8ig. Let gt(w;m) denote the measure of workers
of ability m employed at wage w 2 
 at the end of period t   1.
Conditional on yt = yi (maybe equal to yt 1) at the beginning of period t, no worker
can be employed if Si(m)  0. The inﬂow into the stock of workers paid the minimum
wage wi(m) is otherwise made of all unemployed workers drawing an oﬀer (0ut(m)`m)
plus all employees paid a wage w such that Wi(w;m)   Ui(m) < 0 who were not laid oﬀ
but still were not lucky enough to get poached. The outﬂow is made of those workersON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 12
previously paid wi(m) who are either laid oﬀ or poached. That is,
gt+1(wi(m);m) = 1fSi(m) > 0g

0ut(m)`m






1fWi(w;m)   Ui(m) < 0ggt(w;m)

:
The inﬂow into the stock of workers paid wi(m) has two components. First, any
employee paid less than wi(m) (in present value terms) who is contacted by another
employer beneﬁts from a pay rise to wi(m). Second, any employee paid more than wi(m)
(in present value) has to accept a pay cut to wi(m) to avoid layoﬀ. The only reason to
ﬂow out is layoﬀ. Hence,
gt+1(wi(m);m) = 1fSi(m) > 0g(1   )

1(1   ut(m))`m






1fWi(w;m)   Ui(m) > Si(m)ggt(w;m)

:
For all w 2 
mnfwi(m);wi(m)g, only those workers paid w greater than wi(m) and
less than wi(m) (in value terms), who are not laid oﬀ or poached, keep their wage:
gt+1(w;m) = 1fSi(m) > 0g(1   )(1   1)
 1f0  Wi(w;m)   Ui(m)  Si(m)ggt(w;m):
Note that summing gt+1(w;m) over all wages and dividing by `m yields the law of
motion for the unemployment rates ut(m):
1   ut+1(m) = 1fSi(m) > 0g[0ut(m) + (1   )(1   ut(m))]:
The joint process of distributions and surpluses is Markovian with a ﬁnite state-space.
In principle one can certainly calculate its ergodic distribution, but this is a rather cum-
bersome calculation. In practice, I shall use simulations to approximate the theoretical
moments to match with the data moments used for the estimation of structural parame-
ters.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 13
3. Parametrization and Estimation
3.1. Aggregate shocks. I use the BLS quarterly series of seasonally adjusted real output
per person in the non-farm business sector (BLS series PS85006163) to construct the
aggregate productivity process yt. The data cover the period 1947q1-2009q1. The raw
data are successively log-transformed, HP-ﬁltered, and exponentiated.4
I assume that the aggregate productivity process yt is an ergodic Markov process. I
deﬁne the state of the economy as the rank of yt in its marginal/ergodic distribution,
F. The joint distribution of two consecutive ranks F(yt) and F(yt+1) is a copula C (i.e.
the cdf of the distribution of two random variables with uniform margins). For example,
the usual Gaussian AR(1) process used in the literature has Gaussian margins and a
Gaussian copula. It is commonplace to obtain a discrete approximation of the copula by
calculating the transition probability matrix across discretized states (quintiles, deciles,
etc.) but ﬁtting a parametric copula (Archimedean, elliptical) is much more economical
than ﬁtting all transition probabilities separately.
I use the following two-stage semi-parametric estimation procedure:
(1) Estimate the marginal distribution F by kernel smoothing the empirical distribu-
tion of yt.
(2) Estimate the copula C by maximum likelihood on sample fF(yt 1);F(yt)g. A sim-
ple scatterplot gives a good indication regarding to which parametric speciﬁcation
of the copula to choose.5
Figure 1, panel (a), shows the marginal distribution of detrended productivity. The kernel
density estimate is of course much less dented than the histogram. It resembles a normal
density except for the left tail that is fatter than the normal.
Figure 1, panel (b), provides a graphical display of the copula. The actual scatterplot
(left) indicates an elliptical distribution with no speciﬁc tail-dependence. Hence, I use a
4I follow the usual practice since Shimer (2005) and use a smoothing parameter of 105 instead of the
usual 1;600 with quarterly data. The usual smoothing parameter seems to put too much cycle in the
trend. This is particularly clear for the nearly non-trended unemployment series (see Figure 4 below).
5Chen, Wu, and Yi (2009) argue that a more eﬃcient estimation of the marginal distribution can be
obtained using a single-step estimation if the marginal distribution is peaked and the copula displays
strong tail dependence. This should be less of a problem here because this two-step procedure is applied
to detrended – hence less autocorrelated – data.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 14
t-copula with parameters  (linear correlation coeﬃcient) and  (the number of degrees
of freedom; a large   30, indicates Gaussianity). I estimate  = 0:89 and  = 13:11.
Parameter  is large, indicating a close-to-Gaussian copula. The other scatterplot (right)
shows a simulation of the t-copula with estimated parameters  and . No apparent
discrepancy with the true one can be easily detected.6
Figure 2 displays a simulation of productivity levels. Panel (a) shows the actual series
of exponentiated HP-ﬁltered log-productivity. Panel (b) shows two simulations obtained
with the same sequence of iid uniform innovations: one uses the semi-parametric estimate
and the other one uses a Gaussian AR(1) model. The estimated semiparametric nonlinear
process is indeed very similar to a normal AR(1) process.7
Finally, a discrete Markov chain approximation can be obtained as follows. Let a0 =
y < a1 < ::: < aN = y delimit a grid on the support of the productivity distribution. I use
equal-sized intervals (ai   ai 1 =
y y
N ) and extreme points y and y are chosen according
to the estimated marginal distribution F as F(y) ' 0 and F(y) ' 1. Then,
(1) Set discrete productivity values as bins’ midpoints yi =
ai 1+ai
2 .
(2) Estimate marginal state probabilities as pi = F(ai)   F(ai 1).












6The simulation algorithm is very simple: given observation rt 1 of the (t   1)th rank, generate rt as
t 1
 (rt) = t 1







where et = t
 1
+1(u) with u  Uniform[0;1] (or et  t+1). Then generate yt = F 1(rt) for any marginal
cdf F. Note that for  ! 1, t !  the cdf of the standard normal distribution and the recursive
formula for ranks becomes:
 1(rt) =  1(rt 1) +
p
1   2et
where et  N(0;1). The t-copula thus operates a diﬀerent transformation of the raw data and features
conditional heteroskedasticity.
7For completeness, the autoregression of detrended log-productivity yields an autocorrelation coeﬃcient
 = 0:876 and a standard deviation of residuals  = 0:0097.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 15
(a) Marginal productivity distribution





























































Figure 1. Two-step Estimation of the Aggregate Productivity ProcessON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 16
(a) Actual HP-ﬁltered productivity series






















Figure 2. Simulation of Productivity DynamicsON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 17
3.2. Worker heterogeneity. I specify match productivity as yi(m) = yi(Bxm + C),
where B and C are two constants parametrizing the support of workers’ abilities, and
xm 2]0;1[. Speciﬁcally, xm = m 0:5
M for m = 1;:::;M. The distribution of individual











betapdf(xm;;1) (as M ! 1):
The beta distribution allows for a variety of shapes for the density (increasing, decreasing,
non monotone, concave or convex).











The dynamics of yt diﬀers from the dynamics of yt if composition eﬀects make xt, the
mean ability of employees, diﬀer from the mean ability of all workers, employed and
unemployed. I will thus calibrate the distribution of xm (parameters B;C;) so that the
mean of xt is equal to one and the volatility of lnxt + lnyt is equal to the volatility of
lnyt (that is, the variance of lnxt and the covariance of lnxt and lnyt balance each other
out).
Lastly, the opportunity cost of employment (leisure utility, UI beneﬁts, etc.) is speciﬁed
as zi(m) = z0 + [yi(m)   z0]. I allow for a potential indexation of unemployment ﬂow
utility on productivity. Otherwise the reservation wage of high skill workers is lower in
booms than in busts as unemployed workers face better future prospects in booms than
in busts. Also, if  is low, high skill workers have lower reservation wages than low skill
workers, for exactly the same reason.
3.3. Estimation/calibration. I set the unit of time equal to a quarter. The parame-
ters that have to be estimated are the turnover parameters 0, 1 and , the probabilityON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 18
From Unempl. Job to Job Job to Unempl.
Mean rate, %/month 30%/mth 2.1% 1.5%
(%/qtr) (66%/qtr) (6.2%) (4.5%)
Elasticity wrt unemployment -1.01 -0.61 0.33
(R2) (75%) (71%) (33%)
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Turnover (Source: JOLTS)
of moving upon receiving an outside oﬀer , the leisure cost parameters z0 and , the
parameters of the support of worker heterogeneity, B and C, and parameter  shap-
ing the distribution of heterogeneity. These parameters will be calibrated so as to ﬁt
unemployment, turnover and wage dynamics as I now explain.
I use the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) to measure turnover. The
JOLTS provides information on the number of ﬁrm hires per month (H), the number of
quits (Q) and involuntary separations (layoﬀs and discharges), denoted L. I also use
the total employment series (E) from the Current Employment Statistics (CES), that is
supposedly consistent with the JOLTS series. The number of unemployed (U) is extracted
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These are monthly series spanning 2000m12-
2009m1.
Assuming that no employee voluntarily quits her job to become unemployed (the exact
opposite to assuming that all separations are layoﬀs) the exit rate from unemployment
is
H Q
U (measuring f0t; see section 2.1), the job-to-job mobility rate is the quit rate
Q
E
(measuring f1t) and the layoﬀ rate is L
E (measuring st). The unemployment rate is U
U+E.
Figure 3, panel (a), displays turnover series, and panel (b) graphs the turnover series as
a function of the unemployment rate to emphasize the link with the business cycle. As
expected, hiring rates are procyclical and the layoﬀ rate is countercyclical, with elasticities
reported in Table 2. Shimer (2005, 2007) estimates a separation rate of 3.4% per month
from CPS data, which is roughly the same rate that can be calculated using
Q+L
E from
JOLTS data, i.e. the sum of the layoﬀ rate and the quit rate. Notice that, as already
noticed by Shimer (2007), the elasticity of the layoﬀ rate is not only lower that the other
rates (in absolute value), the correlation is also weaker (as indicated by the R2 of the
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Figure 3. Turnover Dynamics (Source: JOLTS)
Using results in Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), who estimate a wage-posting
equilibrium search model on PSID data, I estimate the proportion of employees’ contactsON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 20
with alternative employers resulting in actual mobility to 53%. I thus set  = 0:5.
Also, because the exit rate of unemployment is so high at the quarterly frequency,8 I
arbitrarily set 0 = 1. Then, the model predicts a job-to-job mobility rate f1t such that
f1t = 1(1 st): This implies a rate of on-the-job oﬀer arrival of 1 = 0:13. This estimate
is consistent with estimates from micro studies (see e.g. Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin
2006). Finally, I set the exogenous job destruction rate  equal to 4.3%. This implies
a minimal frictional unemployment rate of =(1 + ) = 4:12%. This value is slightly
greater than the two lows of the pre-1973 period, and it is slightly less than the lows of
the post-1973 period (see Figure 4).
I set the number of aggregate states equal to N = 50, the number of diﬀerent ability
types equal to M = 500 and I simulate very long series of T = 5000 observations so as
to match the following moments:9
 The mean productivity is 1 and the standard deviation of log productivity is equal
to 0.02; the mean unemployment rate is 5.6% and the standard deviation of log
unemployment is 0.19.10
 The mean layoﬀ rate is 4.5% per quarter (1.5%/month).
 The standard deviation of log wages is 0.017, the elasticity of wages to productivity
is 0.53.11
 Lastly, the mean values of D9/D5 and D5/D1 for wages are equal to 2.05 and 2.20,
and the elasticity of D9/D5 and D5/D1 with respect to productivity are equal to
0.21 and -0.53 (from CPS).
866% using the JOLTS data. Shimer estimates an even higher rate of 83% (45% per month, hence
1   (1   :45)3 = 83% per quarter) using CPS data.
9A high number of worker types is necessary to smooth the dynamics of unemployment (more on this
later) and I simulate a large number of observations to reduce the variance of empirical moments.
10These moments were calculated using HP-ﬁltered, long (1947q1-2009q1), quarterly series from the BLS
as in Shimer (2005).
11I use hourly compensation (BLS series PRS85006103) divided by the implicit output deﬂator
(PRS85006113), readjusted per person by multiplying by hours (PRS85006033) and dividing by em-
ployment (PRS85006013). One argument in favour of this series is that when I detrend it using the
HP-ﬁlter with the same smoothing parameter, I obtain exactly the same trend as for productivity, and
regressing wages on productivity gives a coeﬃcient of one. Note that the estimated elasticity is close to
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Figure 4. Unemployment series (The series are ﬁrst log-transformed be-
fore passing the HP-ﬁlter. The cycle is then re-exponentiated and mul-
tiplied by the mean value of raw levels. This is done in order to avoid
negative values in ﬁltered series. The cycle in the bottom panel is obtained
for a smoothing parameter of 105. The top panel shows that the usual
smoothing parameter value of 1,600 generates a very cyclical trend.)ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 22











































Figure 5. Heterogeneous Productivity
The wage moments aim at identifying parameter , as for any value of  there is an
observationally equivalent value of (z0;B;C) yielding the same unemployment values
and surpluses, and also at identifying the range of worker heterogeneity [C;B + C].
3.4. Results. I estimate  = 0:5, z0 = 0:6115, B = 0:935, C = 0:5935,  = 1:33.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of worker heterogeneity and how it aﬀects individual
productivity given the state of the economy. Every thin line in the top panel corresponds
to a diﬀerent ability type. The thick line in the middle is the aggregate productivity
level yi. The other thick line at the bottom indicates the viability threshold: for a given
aggregate state i, all individual types m such that Si(m)  0 have their productivity
below the threshold. Only very few lines are below the threshold; namely, 16 (out of 500)ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 23



























Figure 6. Mean Unemployment Beneﬁt/Output Ratio (zt(m)=yt(m)) by Ability
low productivity types, 4.85% of all workers, bear a risk of endogenous layoﬀ. The bottom
panel displays the distributions of workers’ expected productivity in the whole population,
and in the sub-populations of employed and unemployed workers. As expected, low ability
workers are over-represented amongst the unemployed.
The mean leisure cost zt(m) averaged over worker types and time is 0:80, somewhere
between Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) calibration, 0.95, and Hall and Milgrom’s
(2008), 0.70. Workers in the low range of abilities have a mean unemployment bene-
ﬁt/productivity ratio close to one, whereas high productivity workers have one that is
close to 0.70 (see Figure 6). We shall see that the ability of the model to match the
volatilities of aggregate productivity and unemployment depends on there being a small
fraction of workers at risk of endogenous job destruction. So, the argument of this paper
does not contradict the small surplus argument of Hagedorn and Manovskii.
3.5. Employment and turnover. Table 3 compares various moments calculated on the
actual quarterly series as in Shimer (2005) and on the simulated series. The model also
predicts an exit rate of unemployment in the right interval albeit with a slightly higher
volatility. The moments of the overall separation rate are well reproduced. The model











































































































































































































































































Figure 7. Simulation of Employment and Turnover DynamicsON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 25
given that the volatility is well ﬁtted. Figure 7 shows a simulation of the dynamics of
unemployment and turnover resulting from one particular simulated history of aggregate
productivity shocks (the number of observations is T = 249 which is the number of
quarters in 1947q1-2009q1). The range of unemployment rates is as in the actual series,
but the simulated trajectory seems less smooth that the true one (see Figure 4).
The elasticity of the exit rate from unemployment with respect to unemployment is
correctly reproduced (close to -1) but the elasticities of the separation rate and, even
more so, the job-to-job mobility rate are underestimated with respect to the values that
were calculated with the JOLTS series (Table 2). Yet it is remarkable that the model
predicts that the elasticity of the exit rate of unemployment is bigger than the elasticity
of job separations. This is because the whole volatility of unemployment results from the
behaviour of a small fraction of workers (about 5%), that remains small in the stock of
employees but makes a large proportion of the stock of unemployed.
The mechanism by which productivity shocks are ampliﬁed is simple to understand.
In a boom, unemployment is steady, all separations follow from exogenous shocks (there
is no endogenous layoﬀ in the last 18 aggregate states (32  i  50). When aggregate
productivity falls more workers lose their jobs as more match surpluses become negative
(see Figure 8). About 4% unemployment accrues because of the 4.3% exogenous layoﬀ
rate. One may call this minimum unemployment level frictional unemployment. Classical
unemployment, due to business cycle conditions, ranges between 0 and 5% depending on
the severity of the recession. Note that the correlation between unemployment rates and
productivity shocks is high because the link shown in Figure 8 is smooth and monotone.
A smaller correlation requires more nonlinearity which can be obtained by reducing the
aggregate productivity threshold that triggers endogenous layoﬀ.
3.6. Wages. Table 4 shows that the model can replicate the dynamics of ﬁrst and second-
order statistics of cross-sectional wage distributions (means and inequality indices) well.
In particular, the dynamics of wage inequality in the upper part of the distribution
is procyclical, and it is counter-cyclical in the bottom part. Overall, countercyclicality
dominates. I also compare annual earnings with present values. Given that labour supplyON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 26
yt ut f0t st f1t
Actual moments ((Shimer, 2005))
mean 1 0.056 0.83 0.045
std 0.020 0.19 0.118 0.075
corr with lnyt 1 -0.41 0.40 -0.52
reg on lnyt 1 -4.08 4.56 -1.95
Simulated moments
mean 1 0.054 0.82 0.045 0.062
std 0.018 0.18 0.18 0.067 0.0034
corr wrt lnyt 1 -0.95 0.88 -0.38 0.37
reg on lnyt 1 -9.50 8.86 -1.43 0.072
reg on lnut 1 -0.95 0.128 -0.006
Table 3. Fit of Employment and Turnover Moments (Rows labelled
“mean” refer to the mean of levels while the other rows refer to the log
of the variable in each column.)
























Figure 8. Unemployment Rate as a Function of the Aggregate Shock (For
each step down a new group of low ability workers of about the same size
(0.43%) becomes employable as aggregate productivity rises. There are 17
steps because only 16 out of M = 500 workers types, 4.4% of all workers,
face endogenous unemployment risk. When the aggregate productivity
index reaches about 1.02 all workers have positive surplus. Note that the
unemployment rate does not quite jump to its state-contingent equilibrium
value, but nearly does.)
is reduced to the extensive margin in the model, it makes sense to consider present values
as a way of reconstructing an intensive margin. Countercyclicality now shows up in both
the upper and the bottom parts of the present value distributions. One diﬀerence betweenON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 27
Hourly wages Annual earnings
Mean D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1
Actual series
mean 2:05 2:20 4:55 2:08 2:88 6:00
std () 0:017 0:023 0:030 0:026 0:018 0:078 0:081
corr w/ yt
() 0:64 0:15  0:31  0:21  0:10  0:31  0:32
reg on yt
() 0:53 0:21  0:53  0:32  0:10  1:41  1:51
Simulated series
Wages Present values
Mean D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1 D9/D5 D5/D1 D9/D1
mean 0:84 1:57 2:52 3.96 1:22 1:28 1:55
std 0:012 0:0051 0:009 0:0054 0:0028 0:0040 0:0064
corr w/ yt 0:86 0:94  0:84  0:54  0:83  0:85  0:93
reg on yt 0:53 0.27  0:40  0:13  0:13  0:20  0:34
Table 4. Fit of Wage Moments (Column “Mean” either refers to the BLS
series (deﬂated per person compensation) or to the cross-section mean in
the simulated data. Columns “D9/D5”, “D5/D1” and “D9/D1” are the decile
ratios of either hourly wages and annual earnings calculated from the CPS
(panel “Actual series”), or wages and present values, Ui(m) or Wi(m), for
simulated data.)
actual and simulated data is that the volatilities of simulated inequality indices are much
lower, equal to about one fourth of their actual values. This suggests that there are
sources of wage dispersion that the model does not account for (ﬁrm heterogeneity for
example).
So the model can generate a median wage that is less procyclical than the ﬁrst and last
deciles. Table 5 shows an interesting phenomenon that goes one step forward towards an
explanation. The bottom of the wage distribution only includes starting wages (wi(m))
and the top only promotion wages (wi(m)), and for this calibration at least, the median
wage is also a promotion wage. Moreover, starting wages are considerably more pro-
cyclical than promotion wages. Lastly, the procyclicality of starting wages diminishes
with their rank, while the opposite is true for promotion wages. Consequently, wages in
the middle of the distribution are the least procyclical.
Pissarides (2009) builds an argumentation based on wages in new jobs being diﬀerent
from wages in on-going spells. He also documents a long list of empirical papers contrast-
ing the cyclicality of wages at the beginning of job spells and that of wages in on-going
spells. Initial wages are usually found more procyclical than on-going wages. Note thatON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 28
Starting wages Promotion wages All wages
Mean
D9 0.59 1.37 1.33
D5 0.40 0.98 0.85
D1 0.15 0.69 0.30
Cyclicality (elasticity wrt productivity)
D9 0.85 0.69 0.65
D5 1.00 0.56 0.39
D1 1.74 0.38 0.78
Table 5. Cyclicality of Starting vs Promotion Wages (simulated data)
the opposition between initial and on-going wages that is used in the literature is less
marked than the opposition between starting and promotion wages that is introduced
here; ﬁrst, because on-going wages is not a very precise concept, and second, because
ﬁrst wages in new jobs are qualitatively diﬀerent depending on whether a new job fol-
lows unemployment or another job. Therefore, I conjecture the empirical elasticity wedge
between starting and promotion wages to be bigger than between initial and on-going
wages.
In order to better understand why starting wages and promotion wages have these
distinct cyclical patterns, I next consider the following variance decomposition exercise.








Three variables zit contribute to wage dispersion (the set fwj(m);wj(m);8j;mg): worker
heterogeneity (m), aggregate state dependence (j) and the worker’s threat point in bar-
gaining (w or w).
Table 6 shows the between and within contributions of each of these three sources of
wage dispersion. The threat point explains 60% of wage dispersion; aggregate state de-
pendence, 40%; and ability only 15%. Bertrand competition, via the diﬀerence between
starting wages and promotion wages is the main determinant of the level of inequal-
ity. However, only aggregate state dependence contributes negatively, and strongly, to
cyclicality.ON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 29
Variance Total Between Within
Group = ability
Share 0.127 0.022 (15%) 0.116
Std of log 0.027 0.055 0.022
Elasticity 1.29 2.92 1.00
Group = aggregate state
Share 0.127 0.052 (40%) 0.076
Std of log 0.027 0.19 0.11
Elasticity 1.29 -2.42 3.57
Group = starting/promotion
Share 0.127 0.083 (60%) 0.055
Std of log 0.027 0.021 0.039
Elasticity 1.29 0.89 1.90
Table 6. Wage Variance Decomposition
Thus, although the mechanism for amplifying productivity shocks in unemployment
volatility that I discuss here bears no relation with wage stickiness, in contradistinction
with the previous literature on the subject, wage stickiness seems to be decisive to explain
the relative cyclicality patterns of diﬀerent wage quantiles. When productivity increases
workers with a low wage (a starting wage) credibly threaten to quit to unemployment as
their reservation wage increases with aggregate productivity, and ﬁrms are thus forced
to renegotiate wages up. This is the main determinant of the stronger procyclicality of
low wages. At the other end of the distribution, when aggregate productivity falls (in a
downturn), workers with high wages are forced by their employer to accept a cut as the
ﬁrm surplus becomes negative. This is the main determinant of the stronger procyclicality
of high wages. Wage renegotiation without alternative oﬀers therefore has a remarkable
eﬀect on wage inequality dynamics.
4. Conclusion
We have proposed a simple dynamic search-matching model with cross-sectional wage
dispersion and worker heterogeneous abilities. Worker heterogeneity interacts with aggre-
gate shocks to match productivity in a way that allows for endogenous job destruction.
It suﬃces that a small fraction of the total workforce be at risk of a shock to produc-
tivity that renders the match surplus negative to amplify productivity shocks enough toON THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS 30
generate the observed unemployment volatility. Moreover, we show that the model can
generate inequality dynamics similar to the observed pattern: wages in the middle of the
distribution are less procyclical than wages in the bottom and the top. We argue that
it reﬂects the lumpy renegotiation process implied by long-term contracts following pro-
ductivity shocks. Extreme wages are subject to renegotiation as low wages may become
lower than workers’ reservation wages after a positive productivity shock and high wages
may become greater than ﬁrms’ reservation wages following a negative shock. Wages in
the middle of the distribution are more likely to remain in the bargaining set.
Our prototypical model is extremely simple to simulate outside the steady-state equilib-
rium and still generates very rich dynamics. This is due to two very strong assumptions:
ﬁrms have full monopsony power and they are identical. Giving workers some bargain-
ing power as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and Dey and Flinn (2005) and
allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity as in Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2009), in a macrodynamic
model, are very exciting avenues for further research.
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